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Introduction 
 Civil war has been a defining feature of ethnic relations in Myanmar since the country’s 
independence in 1948. Although dates for the start of the conflict in Kachin State vary, the war is 
generally agreed to have begun in 1961— the year the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 
and its military wing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was established by Kachin students  
(Anderson & Sadan, 2016). A ceasefire, signed in 1994, paused hostilities between the KIA and the 
Myanmar State for 17 years. However, fighting reignited in 2011 and continues to the present day. 
 The drivers of the Kachin conflict have been examined across the literature, with some 
academics focusing on the economic factors that drive ethnic grievances (Brenner, 2015; Kiik, 
2016a, 2016b; Walton, 2013; Woods, 2011, 2016), while others have shown how the cultural 
chauvinism of successive Burman-dominated governments has impacted ethnic conflict (Houtman, 
1999; Smith, 1999). However, there is now a growing body of work that examines the centrality of 
issues like language and education in motivating the ethnic rebellion in Kachin State (Lall & South, 
2014, 2018; South & Lall, 2016).  
 Language in local education is undoubtedly of great consequence to the Kachin, as many of 
them live in rural areas and have limited or no proficiency in Burmese. The culturally repressive 
policies of Burmanisation and Myanmarification caused deep animosity amongst ethnic peoples 
under military-rule (Houtman,1999; Smith, 1999). However, this thesis argues that in the current 
renewed Kachin conflict, other issues are more crucial in fuelling the conflict. Martin Smith 
proposes in his 2007 paper State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, that the 
dynamics of ethnic conflict are cyclical in nature, with continuing violence being fuelled by 
continued military rule, ongoing military offensives, widespread military atrocities and a lack of 
guaranteed ethnic rights in Myanmar’s constitution. This thesis proposes that Myanmar, particularly 
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in Kachin State, has entered a sixth cycle of ethnic conflict, and that the current ethnic conflict in 
Kachin state is fundamentally fuelled by these four criteria.  
 In order to support the thesis’ hypothesis, it uses the following structure: firstly, the author 
situates the Kachin in their contemporary socio-economic context; secondly, a survey of the 
academic literature on ethnic conflict and its drivers in Kachin State, laying a basis for this thesis’ 
line of argumentation. The following section will provide an introspection on language and 
educational policy in Myanmar’s history. This section will show how issues of language have 
historically caused ethnic antagonism and have been used for political ends. The fourth section will 
offer a focused historiography of the conflict between the State and ethnic Kachin rebels. And the 
final chapter of this thesis will draw on the academic literature and field interviews conducted with 
Kachin leaders, to propose that the Kachin conflict represents a sixth cycle of ethnic conflict in the 
Southeast Asian nation. The politicians interviewed for this thesis, Dr. Manam Tu Ja and Maran Ja 
Seng Hkawn, both moved from KIO/A leadership roles into politics, giving them a deep 
understanding of what motivates conflict in Kachin State. This final chapter is divided intro four 
sub-sections: representing the the four underlying central factors driving conflict; namely 
continuing military control/power; ongoing military offensives; widespread military atrocities; and 
ethnic rights and the 2008 constitution.  
The Kachin 
 Kachin peoples in Myanmar are estimated to number roughly 750,000, which constitutes 
approximately 1.5% of the country’s population (Jacquet, 2014). Being predominantly christian, the 
Kachin Baptist Church (KBC) has some 400,000 members, making it the largest denomination 
amongst the 90-95% of Kachin that are Christian (Mang, 2016). However, like many peoples that 
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are indigenous to borderlands, the Kachin do not solely inhabit Myanmar, as Kachin peoples can be 
found in both Yunnan, China and Arunchal Pradesh, India (Sadan, 2013). However, the ethnonym 
‘Kachin’ is used solely to describe the Kachin living in Myanmar. The term Kachin was only 
adopted during the 19th century, and is an umbrella term for tribal groups that self-affiliate or have 
close connections with the Jinghpaw clan. Thus, the term ‘Kachin’ usually refers to the ethnic sub-
groups of the Jinghpaw clan, as well as Lanwngwaw, Rawang, Lachid, Zaiwa and Lisu tribal groups 
(Jacquet, 2014). The use of ‘Kachin’ as a signifier common identity has - for the most part - been 
internalised by the smaller nations. Even though minority groups within the broader Kachin identity 
group may affiliate with the larger umbrella term of Kachin for political expediency, the identity 
signifier ‘Kachin’ is widely accepted throughout the population (Thawnghmung, 2011).  
 Like many of Myanmar’s ethnic minority groups, the majority of Kachin live in dire 
poverty, with 28% of Kachin living below the poverty line (Logan, 2018). Food poverty is a 
significant problem for a large proportion of Kachin people, an estimated 9 out of 10  people living 
in Kachin State lack sufficient food for four months of the year (Aung et al., 2016). Education in 
Myanmar is generally far below the standards of its regional neighbours, however, in the rural 
ethnic areas education is even more limited than in Myanmar’s centre. Government schools have 
essentially ceased to function outside of the major cities and towns across Kachin state (Lall & 
South, 2014). Access to healthcare in rural areas is almost entirely absent, while the expense of 
primary healthcare limits accessibility in urban areas. Infant and maternal mortality rates are far 
higher in rural communities that lack adequate healthcare, with malaria, diarrhoea, and post-natal 
infections presenting serious threats to life (Aung et al., 2016). Over 100,000 internally displaced 
peoples remain stranded in camps across Kachin and Northern Shan State, without access to basic 
services such as primary education, healthcare and clean water. In areas that are outside of 
government control the KIO/A have taken up the mantle of service providers, offering basic 
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education - based upon an alternative curriculum, taught in Jinghpaw - and healthcare to people 
living in its administered areas (South & Lall, 2014; South, 2018).   
 Myanmar’s economy is still largely agricultural, a fact that is especially true for the rural 
highland areas inhabited by ethnic minority groups. While there are a number of large-scale 
infrastructure projects and abundant natural resources in Kachin State, the majority of the 
population remain excluded from the benefits of economic activity, remaining reliant on subsistence 
farming and small-scale agriculture (Jacquet, 2014). While Kachin State has huge potential for the 
construction of hydropower plants, providing lucrative business opportunities to Myanmar’s 
oligarchy, the environmental impacts disproportionately effect rural ethnic communities and offer 
none of the gains (Kattelus et al., 2016). This disproportionate burden of resource exploitation is not 
limited to hydropower, with logging and jade mining also having negative impact on the soil that 
Kachin farmers rely upon for survival.  
Drivers of ethnic conflict in Kachin State 
 Academic debate regarding the drivers of conflict has generally focused on the ‘grievance 
and greed’ framework, with ethnic conflicts generally being taken to be best explained through 
theories that emphasise forms of ‘grievance’ (Laoutides & Ware, 2016). In terming the conflict 
between the Kachin and the state, the role that ethnicity plays in fuelling the conflict is emphasised, 
if not taken for granted (Kramer, 2015; Smith, 2007; South, 2008; Than, 2005). While historical 
grievances have taken a primary role in explaining the Kachin conflict, most studies have been 
prompt to note that the drivers of specific conflicts are varied and complex. Issues of economics 
have always been a part of ethnic conflict in Myanmar, with a number of studies highlighting the 
role that economic exploitation and economic inequality have played in exacerbating the conflict 
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(Woods, 2011; Brenner, 2015). Issues of economic exploitation have often been seen as arguments 
that support theories of ‘greed’ as conflict drivers (Laoutides & Ware, 2016). Yet, in many cases, of 
which the Kachin conflict is one, a more complex intermingling of motives seem to fuel conflict, 
with issues of ethnic identity playing a large role in the popular narrative of the conflict amongst the 
general population.  
 In order to survey the literature on ethnic conflict, a brief synopsis of the scholarly material 
written on ethnicity is required. The term ethnicity has numerous political and social connotations 
and has been characterised in the literature as ‘vague’ (Eller, 1997, p.552) and 
‘ambiguous’ (Malešević, 2004, p.160). Although the word may entail a degree of ambiguity, a 
classic definition of ethnicity is “the condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group”, which is 
to say it is an “objective condition” (Glazer & Moynihan, 1974, p.1). A contemporary definition of 
ethnicity has added to this by noting a “self-perpetuating quality” to ethnicity, one which is 
inherited from generation to generation (Cashmore, 2004, p.142). However, definitions that are 
broader in scope are intrinsically connected to the theory or theories from which they stem. The 
majority of theories on ethnicity fall into three schools of thought, namely primordialist, 
intstrumentalist and constructivist. Primordialist theories have been generally disregarded by the 
academy, but classically regard ethnicity as primordial, essential in nature and permanent (Geertz, 
1963). The instrumentalist approach stresses the fluidity of ethnicity, which can be manipulated for 
socio-political gains (Blimes, 2006). Finally, the constructivist approach regards ethnicity as a 
continual process that is “negotiated and constructed in everyday living” (Isajiw, 1993, p.4). A 
constructivist approach has been used to show how Kachin ethnic identity is constructed and 
reconstructed through social interactions across space and time (Sadan, 2013).  
 Explanations of ethnic conflict have similarly been moulded by theoretical perspective and 
field of study. Even though some scholars have challenged the legitimacy of ethnic conflict as an 
academic field (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Gilley, 2004), ethnic conflict is ever-present in the 
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scholarly literature. The primordialist perspective typically regards the permanent nature of 
ethnicity to drive conflict, as historical grievances are manifested as ‘ancient hatreds’ (Blimes, 
2006, p. 537). Conversely, instrumentalists argue that ethnic conflict is driven by socio-economic 
and political contexts. Lake and Rothschild note, “by itself, ethnicity is not a cause of violent 
conflict”, only when coupled with historical social inequities does ethnicity appear, “as one of the 
major fault lines along which societies fracture” (Lake & Rothschild, 1998, p.7). Gurr and Moore 
propose that historically repressive state policies and collective ‘grievance’ lead to mobilisation 
along ethnic lines, a potential precursor of ethnic conflict (1997). State suppression of language 
rights, leading to - actual or perceived - linguistic decline or loss has the potential to foster ethnic 
tension and, potentially, conflict (Bostock, 1997). Post-colonial perspectives have highlighted the 
impact of colonial histories of exploitation on uneven development, which has in turn the potential 
to foster ethnic conflict (Blanton, Mason & Athow, 2001).  
 A number of conflict drivers have to used to characterise patterns of ethnic conflict in 
Myanmar. Indeed, historical grievances and state repression are noted as a key issues in the ‘cycles 
of conflict’ identified by Martin Smith. These cycles of violence have perpetuated into the present 
due to rampant human rights abuses and frequent campaigns launched by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar 
army) against a number of armed groups, the continuation of the military’s stranglehold of politics, 
and a lack of representation of ethnic political and social rights in the 2008 constitution (2007). 
Military government policies spanning from the 1960s until the democratisation period sought to 
Burmanise or Myanamaify ethnic populations, fuelling ethnic tension and violence (Smith, 1999; 
Houtman, 1999).While the economic inequality between ethnicities that has been enforced by 
continuing Burman-privileging state policies has fuelled ethnic mistrust (Walton, 2016). Other 
studies have stressed the role of economic cooptation of ethnic elites in radicalising a new 
generation of ethnic rebels in Kachin (Brenner, 2015). Myanmar’s military state sought to expand 
its state-building objectives throughout its borderlands through the allotment of resource 
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concessions, a key conflict point between the KIO and the State (Kiik, 2016a, 2016b; Woods, 2011, 
2016). 
 Studies of educational and language policy’s impact on ethnic conflict remain few, however, 
a growing body of work has emerged (Lall & South, 2014, 2018; Salem-Gervais & Metro, 2012; 
South & Lall, 2016). Salem-Gervais and Metro’s study of the nation-building process in Myanmar 
through history curricula highlights the assimilation processes of Burmanisation and 
Myanmaification. The authors describe how historical narratives attempt to folklorise ethnic 
histories, through which the state attempts to, “render minorities unthreatening to the dominance of 
majority culture, while preventing the accusation of cultural hegemony” (2012, p.46). A study by 
Lall and South compares the extra-state education systems developed by different ethnic armed 
groups (EAGs), highlighting the benefits of curriculum taught in ethnic mother-tongue and 
Burmese in aiding university admission (2014). A study of the KIO education system, by the same 
authors, described the development of a more anti-Burmese curriculum since the breakdown of the 
ceasefire. In this study the authors posit, “language and education policy and practice are deeply 
implicated in ethnic conflicts in Myanmar” (South & Lall, 2016, p.145). Lall and South have 
additionally restated the centrality of language and education issues to ethnic conflict, and argued 
that opportunities to address educational reform are being missed in the peace process (2018).  
  
Language Policy and Education in Myanmar: A History 
 The role of language in education in Myanmar has been, since independence from the 
British, broadly characterised by the suppression of ethnic minority rights and language use and the 
Burman cultural hegemony imposed by the policies implemented by successive central 
governmental regimes. Using four rough periods - U Nu’s post-independence parliamentary era 
governments (1948-1962), the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) led by Ne Win 
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(1962-1988), the military junta of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (1988-2007), and the political reform era 
(2008-2015) - this section shall highlight the history of language policy in Myanmar and its effect 
on education systems. However, to be able to elaborate on policy towards language use and its 
impact on education in Myanmar, it is first necessary to briefly establish the administrative order 
that predated the establishment of the independent state, namely the British Colonial Administration 
in Burma. 
British Colonial Rule (1824-1942) 
 Burma’s colonial capital, Rangoon, was officially annexed into the British empire in 1824, 
following a British sea-borne invasion that commenced the First Anglo-Burman War (1824-6). Over 
the course of the nineteenth century the British Indian Army would fight another 2 wars, the Second 
Anglo-Burman War of 1852 and Third Anglo-Burman War of November 1885, eventually 
integrating the territory that constitutes the modern state of Myanmar as a province of British India 
in 1886. By the 1890s the British had established a functioning military administration in Central 
and Southern Myanmar (Taylor, 2007). Although the British had managed to pacify the coastal and 
lowland areas, there remained a perception that the Burmans were 'untrustworthy' or ‘rebellious’, a 
perception that prompted colonial administrators to favour ethnic minority groups in positions of 
power, “especially some of the Kayin (Karen) population, who were the beneficiaries of the 
Christian missionary educational institutions which flourished in southern Myanmar under the 
auspices of the British” (Taylor, 2007, p.74). Christian missionaries not only opened schools and 
educational institutions, but also formulated written texts for languages used by ethnic groups such 
as the Kachin, Chin and Lahu (Hlaing, 2008). While ethnic minorities found status in the colonial 
administration in the Burmese lowlands, the British adopted a system of ‘indirect rule’ in the 
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province’s highlands. The British allowed the traditional leaders of ethnic groups populating 
Burma’s frontier areas to hold political and administrative power over their domains and, in return, 
these sawbwas (Shan) and duwas (Kachin) would pledge fealty to British authorities (Taylor, 2007). 
 Education policy in Burma came under the auspices of the Indian Education Service, with 
the British deeming education to be primarily a secular undertaking. This view of education 
deprivileged the role of the Sangha, the Buddhist monkhood, in education provision, who had 
administered literary education for males since potentially the eleventh century, or earlier 
(Cheesman, 2003). Once the bedrock of learning under Burmese dynasties, the role of Buddhism in 
education fell afoul of the supposed British policy of ‘religious neutrality’ (Taylor, 2007, p.79). 
Secular education soon became the sole means for the advancement of indigenous peoples to 
advance into administrative roles, to enter the legal services, or to succeed in commerce (Cheesman, 
2003; Taylor, 2007). Indeed, this undermining of the sangha’s role in education and the relative 
privileging of christian missionary schooling in areas that had previously remained outside the fold 
of Buddhist education, namely the ethnic minority areas, caused great tension between the Burman 
majority, the British and ethnic minorities. Minority groups began to form nationalist ideals based 
on opposition to the Burman majority, a process that was often funnelled through Christian 
organisations. 
 This separation of Burma’s indigenous peoples by ethnicity was underpinned in British 
colonial era curriculums and textbooks, through which the aforementioned antagonistic reading of 
historical centre-periphery social relations and Britain’s paternalistic positioning as civilisation 
bringer were normalised. A 1927 geography textbook from colonial Burma uses such overt 
paternalistic phrasing to be uncomfortable to the modern reader:  
Burma has become a member of the great family of Nations, the British Empire. 
Burma shares in the peace, protection and prosperity the mother country brings her 
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children — natural or adopted. Burma is one of the adopted children. Without 
protection, there might not be peace; without peace, prosperity suffers. Burma needs 
these; Britain, the mother country, brings them (Rowlands, 1927, p.3 qtd. in Salem-
Gervais and Metro, 2012, p.31). 
Similarly history textbooks similarly promoted the British conquest of Burma as an endeavour to 
emancipate formerly oppressed ethnic groups from the oppression of Burman kings:  
The English conquest came not to destroy but to fulfill. Racial character cannot 
develop so long as government is unstable. […] Thrice they achieved a measure of 
unity [Anawratha, Bayinnaung, Alaungpaya]. It was seldom true unity, for whenever 
it was more than nominal it was maintained by means so terrible that they destroyed 
the end; and it seldom lasted for the bond was purely dynastic and broke thrice 
(Harvey, 1926, p.185 qtd. in Salem-Gervais and Metro, 2012, p.32).  
The above excerpts serve to illustrate the nature of British colonial rule, that being the practice of 
divide and rule, while simultaneously supporting Britain’s claims to legitimate governance. These 
methods promoted ethnic division through nationalised secular education and further heightened 
growing animosity between Burma’s indigenous peoples.  
 Language policy in education in Burma under the colonial administration allowed for the 
use of Burmese in sangha schools, however, as the only path to administerial positions was through 
one of the Anglo-vernacular secular schools founded by the British, Burmese-medium education 
and literacy dramatically declined throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(Cheesman, 2003). The issue of language in education was dramatically politicised in the 1920s as 
the University Act introduced tougher enrolment criteria for Rangoon University, which included a 
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high proficiency in written English. As the vast majority of Burmese students were unable to meet 
these newly imposed criteria, nationalists regarded the move as precluding Burmese youth from 
advancement professionally, economically and socially. This spurred nationalists to found national 
colleges that promoted the learning and use of Burmese, as well as nationalist organisations 
promoting Burmese education. The most noteworthy of these organisations was the Do Bama 
Asiayone (DBA), which grew in importance throughout the 1940s. The DBA based its nationalist 
ideology in Burmese and Buddhism, yet claimed to represent all peoples indigenous to Burma, a 
fact that fostered animosity amongst ethnic minorities (Hlaing, 2008).  
The Japanese War and Decolonisation (1942-1948) 
 The advent of war in Burma led to the majority of schools ceasing to operate. As the British 
retreated to form a government in exile in Simla, India, leaving the Japanese to re-establish 
schooling in its own image (Cheesman, 2003). Burman nationalists were determined not to accept 
education that was not solely Burmese medium, boycotting Japanese run institutions and setting up 
Burmese medium schools outside of the Japanese-run education system. However, these schools 
were chronically understaffed, underfunded and undersupplied and these schools failed towards the 
end of the conflict (Cheesman, 2003). Although the Japanese education platform had for the first 
time placed much greater emphasis on Burmese language instruction in schools, Burman 
nationalists did not accept the replacing of one colonial education system with that of another 
coloniser.  
 After the defeat of the Japanese by both the indigenous independence armies and British 
forces, the British backed government in exile in Simla returned to continue the administration of 
Burma in October of 1945 (Lwin, 2000). However, by 1946 the British were resigned to the fact 
that Burmese independence was inevitable and began to set out plans for the creation of an 
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independent Burmese state (Walton, 2008). The transition of Burma from British colony to 
independent state marked a new chapter for the nations indigenous peoples, yet also highlighted the 
importance of language issues to the nationalist causes of the Burmans and ethnic minority peoples. 
The Second Panglong Conference of 1947 organised by the British and Burman nationalist leaders 
to establish a constitution for the newly independent Burma. In attendance at the conference were 
representatives of Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic groups, while four Karen delegates remained as 
‘observers’ not officially participating in negotiations (Walton, 2008). The Mon and Arakanese were 
notable absentees from the Panglong meetings as they were not considered frontier area ethnic 
groups, but were rather included in the Ministerial Burma administrative area (Walton, 2008).  
 Two notable issues in the proceedings involving language arose, namely the placing of 
Burmese as the national language and the criteria for ethnic statehood within the union of Burma. 
The first of these issues was accepted by the participating ethnic delegates as a common lingua 
franca was seen as a necessity for an independent state and there was the larger issue of statehood  
at stake, although many leaders felt English to be a more neutral choice (Hlaing, 2008). As one of 
the principal reasons for the Panglong Conference was to establish which ethnic groups would gain 
greater administrative freedom under the union, criteria for statehood needed to be established. One 
of these criterion was that the ethnic groups demanding statehood had to “possess, among other 
things, a language totally different from Burmese” (Hlaing, 2008, p.154). 
U Nu post-independence Parliamentary Era (1948-1962) 
 Following independence in 1948, the Anti-fascist People’s Freedom League’s (AFPFL) 
socialist government set out to formulate a national education policy as part of a broader set of 
social welfare programmes. Under the state’s new education policy, national education was to be 
centralised under the guidance of the Ministry of Education, with funding for all state-run 
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institutions coming directly from the ministry (Cheesman, 2003). The AFPFL seemingly attempted 
to foster a greater degree of understanding between Burma’s indigenous ethnic groups, with newly 
printed history textbooks promoting ideas of ethnic unity through its historical narrative (Salem-
Gervais and Metro, 2012). Additionally, according to Hlaing, U Nu - the Union’s Prime Minister - 
“publicly declared that national unity would only emerge if the Government instituted a system that 
accommodated the cultural difference amongst ethnic groups” (2008, p.155). However, the 
government still promoted Buddhist missionary work and the teaching of Burmese in ethnic 
minority areas, with U Nu believing reconciliation with ethnic minority groups to be easier if they 
shared a religion and language with the Burman majority (Hlaing, 2008). In addition to the 
promotion of Buddhism and Burmese in ethnic minority areas, the newly instated educational 
policy paid little attention to the medium of education for non-Burmese mother tongue students 
(Lwin, 2000). Nevertheless, schools at a pre-university level were not prohibited from teaching in 
ethnic languages if the majority of students were of a specific ethnicity, which meant that mother-
tongue education continued throughout the parliamentary era (Hlaing, 2008). Even though U Nu’s 
government allowed ethnic mother-tongue education to continue as part of the national education 
system up until university level, the promotion of Burmese and Buddhism remained a source of 
contention, being viewed by many elites to be an intrusion of a Burman chauvinistic state.  
 The expansion of Burmese medium education in in ethnic areas potentially had more 
negative impact on U Nu’s government’s attempts to appease ethnic elites as the increased 
proficiency in Burmese allowed ethnic leaders to communicate amongst each other, while also 
allowing them more easily to keep abreast with government rhetoric. According to Hlaing, “Most 
minority leaders in those days understood English but many of them were not comfortable 
discussing political matters in English. So Shan, Kachin, Mon, Karen and Chin leaders 
communicated in Burmese” (2008, p.159). The increased level of literacy in Burmese amongst 
ethnic minorities allowed for a deeper understanding of the central government’s Burman 
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chauvinistic rhetoric. In pandering to Burman communities, political parties regularly used 
nationalist discourses that had emerged during the fight to end colonialism, those developed by the 
Do Bama Asiyone that emphasised Burman culture and the status of Burmese. Community leaders 
that had received education in Burmese during the parliamentary era highlighted the chauvinistic 
statements of politicians and were able to use them to promote their own anti-Burman brands of 
nationalism. During the parliamentary era, the central government’s education policy allowed for 
the spread of Burmese as the union’s national language, yet contrary to the belief of the U Nu 
government, this increased closeness deepened the growing divide between the government and 
ethnic elites (Hlaing, 2008). Without addressing the underlying dissatisfaction of the ethnic elites, 
increased knowledge of Burmese simply allowed ethnic leaders to understand the chauvinistic 
rhetoric of government officials.  
 By the late 1950s, rapid social and political destabilisation caused by insurgency - the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Chinese nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces’ incursions 
along the northern border with China, and ethnic rebels had taken up arms against the state - , 
massive corruption, and general political mismanagement had left U Nu’s government on the brink 
of collapse. In lieu of a political solution, General Ne Win was asked to set up a caretaker 
government that would hold power until 1960. Ne Win’s government initially seemed successful at 
tackling corruption, increasing the state’s control over local militias and addressing bureaucratic 
inefficiency. However, after the elections of 1960 the civilian government formed again by Prime 
Minister U Nu proved unable to address the problems that had caused political disintegration just 2 
years earlier (Englehart, 2005). Finally, in March 1962 Ne Win led a military coup seizing power, 
bringing Burma’s parliamentary era to a close.  
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The BSPP Era Led by Ne Win (1962-1988) 
 In the wake of the military takeover in March 1962, the Tatmadaw formed a Revolutionary 
Council (RC) made up of Ne Win’s personal military acolytes. The RC soon set about eliminating 
potential threats to its power, arresting U Nu in addition to other political leaders and dissolving the 
country’s parliament (Holmes, 1967). The RC had complete control over the political landscape by 
April and set about transforming Burma into a one-party state through the establishment of the only 
legal political party, the BSPP, in June of 1962 (Holmes, 1967; Devi, 2014). With opposition to the 
RC tamed, the junta set about implementing a radical new political and social ideology, namely “the 
Burmese Way to Socialism”. The ideology paved the way for a process of ‘Burmanization’ that 
would nationalise all industry, banking, retail, natural resource production and private schooling 
(Devi, 2014). This was done not only because Ne Win felt Burma had lost sight of Aung San’s post-
independence promises of a course to socialism, but also due to the extreme “xenophobia among the 
highly nationalistic members of the Burmese Revolutionary Council government who want[ed] to 
eliminate the vestiges of the old dominant foreign cultural” (Holmes, 1967). 
 The government’s newly coined ideology was far broader than simply economic 
nationalisation policy, being viewed by most ethnic leaders as simply embodying the social and 
cultural chauvinism of Burman nationalists. The new constitution implemented by Ne Win’s 
government in 1974 created new ethnic states in the union, totalling seven - Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, 
Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan - the creation of these states was an attempt by the junta to 
systematise administration (Smith, 1999). The constitution established a quasi-civilian 
administration led by the BSPP with Ne Win as its president, nominally civilian the BSPP 
leadership were almost exclusively military men (Farrelly, 2013). The constitution also guaranteed 
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p. 9). Yet these constitutional guarantees paid only lip-service to equality of treatment, as Martin 
Smith notes, “many minorities believed that the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ was simply a cloak for 
‘Burmanization’ in a new political guise” (2002, p.9). The first of the measures to impact ethnic 
minority groups was the closure of independent and religious-based schools that had offered the 
most substantive form of educational services in many minority areas since the colonial era. In 
addition foreign missionaries and educators were expelled from the country. The regime 
implemented a Burmese language curriculum (Devi, 2014), which essentially wiped-out the 
teaching of minority languages past grade four (Smith, 2002). The publication of newspapers and 
journals in languages other than Burmese was greatly restricted and, inevitably, highly censored. In 
addition, access to senior roles in administration and the armed forces were increasingly restricted 
for non-Burmans, which meant to participate in governance minorities had to suppress their ethnic 
identities (Smith, 2002). The effect was the exclusion of the majority of ethnic minority elites from 
participating within the BSPP structure, promulgating further distrust and animosity between 
Burmans and ethnic minorities.  
 The major piece of legislation regarding education policy in during the BSPP era was the 
Basic Education Law, 1966, which further consolidated the central government’s control over and 
supervision of the country’s schools. The law mandated the teaching of ethnic minority languages 
up to the second grade in minority areas, centralised the curriculum and textbook publication. As a 
result the government published textbooks for minority languages up until the 1980s, although 
Kachin course books were discontinued by the 1970s. If students wanted to continue studying 
ethnic languages, lessons could be taught in public schools after normal hours of instruction 
(Hlaing, 2008). Although the Law made provision for the teaching of minority languages, the 
situational contexts in which schooling was provided in ethnic areas meant that, in actuality, the 
majority of public schools in minority areas suspended minority language teaching. Many schools 
were unable to find qualified teaching staff, as the government’s education budget did not include 
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funds for minority language teacher training (Hlaing, 2008). While the government effectively 
caused the degradation of language teaching in minority areas by restricting classes to early 
childhood and defunding teacher training, the government also directly suspended classes when 
they were perceived to be link to rebels (Hlaing, 2008). The government’s suspicion of ethnic 
minority groups created an atmosphere in which ethnic minority desires for mother-tongue 
education were treated as subversive to the union.  
 The vast majority of the academic literature regarding the military state’s educational and 
social policy has deemed the process of Burmanization to have been an overt attempt by the state to 
assimilate ethnic groups into a national identity based on Burman language and culture (Houtman, 
1999; Salem-Gervais & Metro, 2012; Smith, 1999; Lall & South, 2018). Yet, Hlaing counters this 
notion by asserting that, “the Socialist government did not have a clear plan to ‘Burmanize’ the 
entire population …The Government’s major problem was its officials’ failure to represent the 
interests of both the majority Burmans and the ethnic minorities” (2008, p.167). Despite the debate 
over the intention of educational policy, the outcome of the policy during Ne Win’s tenure is not up 
for debate. In the words of Hlaing himself, “For ethnic nationalists, the central and local 
government organs were part of the same authoritarian state, regardless of the true reason behind 
the cessation of minority language classes, the ethnic nationalists strongly believed that the 
Government was responsible for the public schools’ suspension of minority languages classes. 
furthermore, they also resented the Government for not rendering any assistance to them” (Hlaing, 
2008, p.166). Burmanization, whether intended as policy to forcefully assimilate ethnic minorities 
or not, was viewed by ethnic nationalist leaders as merely continuing acts of oppression by the 
Burman-dominated government against ethnic peoples, acts that reinforced ethnic confrontation and 
conflict with the state.  
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The Military Junta of the SLORC/SPDC (1988-2008) 
 As the 1980s drew to a close, Ne Win’s vice-like grip on power began to falter. Mounting 
foreign-debt obligations, the threat of international bankruptcy, and increasing student protests, 
forced Ne Win to step down in July of 1988. Ne Win’s resignation did not stop the escalating 
protests as mainly students took to the streets calling for democratic change in Burma. The junta, 
however, remained willing to dissipate protests with overwhelming force, with thousands dying 
through the late summer months in protests around the country (Farrelly, 2013). In September of 
1988, Ne Win loyalists formed the SLORC government and went about extinguishing protests and 
suppressing political dissent. The government opened the country to international investment and 
finance and made superficial changes to the previous government’s Burmanization policies, aiming 
to publicise the country as a functioning multi-ethnic union. The 1989 international renaming of the 
country to Myanmar was one such change, as Myanmar was the “historic ethnic Burman name for 
Burma” (Smith, 1999). The junta acquiesced to popular demands and held an election in May of 
1990, with the National League for Democracy (NLD) claiming a landslide victory of 82% of seats. 
However, as Members of Parliament elect attempted to convene an inaugural parliament the 
military reneged on the democratisation process, clamping down and arresting 80 politicians 
(Smith, 2002). Following the crackdown, activists fled to areas controlled by the National 
Democratic Forces (NDF) an alliance of ethnic minority armed groups, setting up a government in 
exile, headed by NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Smith, 2002). The junta aggressively suppressed 
popular protests demanding democracy throughout the 1990s and 2000s, in order to focus its 
resources on containing pro-democracy groups the military began to push for cease-fire agreements 
with ethnic armed groups, which, by the mid-1990s, it managed to achieve with seventeen ethnic 
armies (Smith, 2007).  
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 Education remained tightly under the control of the junta during the SLORC/SPDC era with 
the entire curriculum emphasising the military’s role in national unity and political stability, while 
also stressing the ‘honour’ of the Tatmadaw (Fink, 2001). The National Education Committee was 
especially focused on rewriting the historical narratives established by the country’s previous 
iteration of military governance, as the inconvenient reality of independence hero Aung San’s 
daughter leading the democratisation movement forced the government to de-emphasise Aung San 
and to highlight the military’s role in supporting national unity (Fink, 2001; Salem-Gervais & 
Metro, 2012). The SLORC/SPDC government aimed to reconceptualise the union as perpetual and 
ancient, in which only folkloric differences existed between peoples. Folklorisation was used as a 
strategy to undermine claims of ethnic difference and to “render minorities unthreatening to the 
dominance of majority culture, while preventing accusations of cultural hegemony” (Salem-Gervais 
& Metro, 2012, p. 46). This process marked a change from the Burmanization policies of the Ne 
Win era and has been described using the term ‘Myanmaification’ (Houtman, 1999). During the 
SLORC/SPDC era the government kept its tight control over education, yet adapted its regimes of 
propaganda to fit the contemporary narrative of its nation-building endeavour.  
 While education policy during the SLORC/SPDC era deviated from that of Ne Win’s BSPP 
era and was utilised by the junta to establish a new historical narrative for a newly named country, 
educational language policy remained similarly stringent under the military government. For the 
first 10 years of the regime language policy remained the same, however, the 1998 National 
Educational Promotion Program suspended all minority language classes below university level. 
Even at university level, government enforced closures of universities and strict monitoring of 
student groups led to a dramatic decline in ethnic language classes (Hlaing, 2008). The government 
technically allowed the teaching of minority languages outside of school hours, as the previous 
regime had, however, as was the case during the BSPP era, ethnic language classes were viewed 
with suspicion and were regularly suspended. The lack of government funded language classes and 
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the continuing promotion of Burmese through education negatively impacted literacy in ethnic 
minority languages (Hlaing, 2008). The worsening state of ethnic minority language education in 
Myanmar was highly antagonistic for ethnic elites, who saw the government’s policies as actively 
suppressing ethnic minority culture and language, policies that aimed to ‘Myanmaify’ through 
‘Burmanization’.  
  
The Political Reform Era (2008-) 
 As early as 1992 the SLORC government had announced the forming of a National 
Convention (NC) tasked with drawing up a new constitution that would support a multi-party 
democratic system of governance. 702 delegates were selected to represent a variety of social 
groupings, counting military personnel, political party members and ethnic minority representatives 
amongst their number. However, by 1995 the NLD had withdrawn from the convention and was 
adjourned by the SLORC government in 1996 (Smith, 2002). In 2004, the National Convention was 
reconvened without the presence of the NLD, yet with greater ethnic minority participation, 
including ceasefire groups such as the KIO. The NC meetings continued until July 2007, when the 
NC drafted a constitution “virtually identical to that proposed by SLORC in 1993” (Jones, 2014a, p.
791). The junta announced a constitutional referendum in 2008, which proceeded in the wake of the 
devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis (Farrelly, 2013). The referendum was broadly condemned in 
the West and by national opposition groups, however, consequently elections were held in 2010 - in 
spite of the continuing NLD boycott - with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 
winning a majority of seats through extensive voting manipulation. Myanmar’s transition to a 
system resembling a multi-party democracy was further advanced in 2015, when the NLD contested 
elections for the first time since their landslide victory in 1990, again winning a landslide victory 
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with 77.9% of seats in the Lower House and 80% of seats in the Upper House (Thawnghmung, 
2016).  
 Education has been highlighted by successive democratic governments as a key area for 
reform, being seen as the fourth most important area during the USDP years in office (Lall, 2016). 
In Thein Sein’s inaugural speech as Prime Minister in 2011, the USDP leader set out a 10 point 
agenda to tackle Myanmar’s decrepit education system. This agenda included the implementation of 
free and compulsory primary education, capacity building for teachers, budget allocation increases 
and the inclusion of local and international NGOs and IGOs (Lall, 2016). A notable element of the 
government’s reform agenda was the limited decentralisation of educational matters that was 
advocated for in the 2008 constitution, however, the extent to which decentralisation will be 
implemented is still unclear. A National Education Bill passed into law in 2014 by the USDP 
controlled parliament - later ratified with amendments in 2015 - caused uproar amongst students 
and civil society organisations alike. Of particular concern to the protesters were issues relating to 
the teaching of ethnic minority languages and cultures at university level, as well as the freedom of 
universities from political oversight (Lall, 2016). The reform trajectory started by the USDP 
government has largely been continued by Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government, surprising 
academics and journalists alike. Daw Suu’s government’s National Education Sector Plan is largely 
drawn from a draft education plan formulated by the USDP before the 2015 election (Lall & South, 
2018). Although educational reform has begun to be addressed, it will take a number of years before 
the affects of the reforms put in place can be analysed.  
 Language policy in education has begun to be addressed by Myanmar’s law makers. As a 
result of the educational reforms enacted between 2014 and 2016, ethnic minority languages have 
found their way back into state-run classrooms, with ethnic languages being “allowed as ‘classroom 
language’ to help explain concepts when necessary” (Lall & South, 2018, p.485). However, there 
has been limited debate on the adoption of ethnic language medium education in minority areas, 
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while multi or bilingual education has received no attention from the government. Even if reforms 
on ethnic language medium education were to be implemented in the short-term future, the capacity 
of the state to provide teachers capable of teaching in ethnic languages is limited (Lall & South, 
2018). According to UNICEF figures 70% of state school teachers are unable to speak local 
languages, a situation that would require a substantial amount of time and funding to remedy 
(Joliffe & Speers, 2016). While ethnic languages are no longer prohibited from state-run 
institutions, ethnic language issues in education are far from being solved.  
Ethnic Conflict in Kachin State: A History 
 Civil war has, to a large extent, been the defining characteristic of inter-ethnic relations in 
Myanmar since the country’s independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar is home to some of the 
longest running ethnic armed struggles in the world, dating back to the country’s independence. 
Ethnic insurgency in its contemporary form in Kachin State is generally regarded to have begun in 
1961 with the creation of the KIA and KIO, in February and October respectively. However, the 
roots of the conflict, as alluded to in the previous chapter, extend deeper into Myanmar’s historical 
past. Although the nature of Burman-Kachin relations in the pre-colonial era is largely speculative 
(Smith, 1999), wars between ethnic groups were common throughout Burma’s history (Walton, 
2013). However, the lowland kings rarely exerted control over the highlands and Kachin tribes had 
a large degree of independence as long as taxes could be collected. Attempts by the Burman kings 
to exercise greater power in the Kachin Hills was met with what John Cady described as, ‘strenuous 
resistance’ (Cady, 1958, p.42).  
 Despite this history of fluctuating cooperation and confrontation, ethnic tensions were 
exacerbated by colonial rule, which many academics attribute to the British’s colonial metastrategy 
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of ‘divide and rule’ (Salem-Gervais & Metro, 2012). Difference in treatment between ethnic 
groupings by British colonial administrators was prominent in British Indian army recruitment, with 
ethnic groups, particularly the Kachin and Karen, being viewed by the British as possessing a 
heightened capacity to effectively fight. This conception was promoted by Christian missionaries in 
the highland areas, who advanced the notion that the highland ethnic groups were akin to the so-
called ‘martial races’ of India. The predominance of ethnic peoples in the armed forces was at its 
peak in the 1930s, with Karen, Kachin and Chins making up 83% of indigenous troops, even though 
these ethnic groups made up just 13% of the population (Callhan, 2005). As Taylor notes, 
“Myanmar was colonized not only at the height of the power of the British empire but also at the 
height of racist conceptualizations of the moral meaning of ethnic diversity” and British policy 
pointedly acted to differentiate between ethnicities (2007, p.76). This was coupled with a 
conceptual model of pre-colonial Myanmar as a site of ethnic antagonism and perpetual warfare, 
through this conception the British coloniser became the saviour of the ethnic minorities from the 
oppression of the Burmese lowland kings. The outcome of British policy was an “an impression that 
there was more that divided the people than united them” (Taylor, 2007, p.78).  
 The particular saliency of ethnicity in conflict in Myanmar became apparent during the 
Japanese invasion and occupation of Burma, as the Burman-dominated Burma Independence Army 
(BIA) joined the Japanese in ousting the British from the colony, while many ethnic minority 
soldiers remained loyal to the crown and fought with the British. Beginning around the later half of 
1939, a number of the thakins from the DBA, Aung San and Ne Win being the most prominent, 
began to consort with the Japanese, seeking to gain their support for a Burman uprising (Callahan, 
2005). The DBA found in the Japanese a willing partner in their plot to overthrow British rule and 
began to send leaders to receive training in Japan. The BIA was inaugurated on the 28th December 
1941, and followed Japanese soldiers into their homeland following their invasion (Smith, 1999). 
The thakins of the DBA had been wary of ethnic minorities for years prior to the onset of war, a 
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situation that turned to open hostility upon the BIA’s reentry into Burma. A great many atrocities 
against ethnic minorities - particularly the Karen - were committed by BIA troops who razed 400 
Karen villages and killed 1,800 villagers in one township alone (Smith, 1999). These atrocities only 
fuelled the willingness of ethnic minorities to join British and American anti-Japanese irregular 
forces in the northern highlands (Taylor, 2007). The renowned Anthropologist of the Kachin, 
Edmund Leach, was heavily involved in recruiting and leading volunteer guerrillas in the Kachin 
Hills (Anderson & Sadan, 2016). Although the BIA turned on their erstwhile allies later in the war 
and joined the British in expelling the Japanese, the enmity established since the colonial era 
between the Kachins and Burmans created a gulf in trust between them. This lack of trust and 
intolerance came to define Kachin-Burman relations and laid the path to the coming civil war.  
 After the signing of the Panglong Agreement in 1947, there existed a fleeting moment in 
which hope for equality and federalism established a modicum of trust between ethnic minority 
elites and Burman nationalists. However, as Walton notes, “whatever spirit of unity might have 
existed at Panglong was already in tatters at independence” (2013, p.897). Indeed, the pattern of 
violence that has come to define centre-periphery social relations was in full swing by the time the 
Union had marked its first birthday. Already in 1948 Rangoon was under threat of capture from 
ethnic insurgencies and the CPB. The majority of Kachin troops in the Tatmadaw stayed loyal to the 
central government, however, Naw Seng led Kachin troops in rebellion of the state under the banner 
of the Pawng Yawng National Defence Force (Smith, 2016). This brief Kachin insurgency was the 
first manifestation of Kachin militant opposition to the government in Rangoon, laying the 
groundwork for future insurgencies.  
 Despite the short insurrection led by Naw Seng, Anderson and Sadan, have forwarded the 
period spanning 1944 until 1961 as the ‘first ceasefire’ in the Kachin conflict, as the volunteer 
forces organised by the British during the first world war refrained from violence on the basis of 
promises of political reform and devolution of power (2016). However, underground fermentation 
Jagan !27
amongst the Kachin elites began in earnest around 1951. A decade of political hostility towards 
political autonomy for Kachin State reestablished the mistrust that had festered under colonial rule 
and, by 1961, a “small group of Kachin underground militants committed fully to the foundation of 
the Kachin Independence Army” (Anderson & Sadan, 2016, p.52). The formation of the group 
marked either the end of the ‘first ceasefire’ or the beginning of the conflict, however, it is generally 
agreed that the Kachin that formed the KIA/KIO did so out of complete frustration with the central 
government’s lack of engagement on political and economic issues, leaving them - in their mindset - 
with no recourse other than to take up arms.  
 Ne Win’s increased military incursions into ethnic areas and brutal suppression of ethnic 
insurgencies throughout the BSPP era was a hallmark of the general’s attempts to create a union 
through pacification and assimilation. The increased militarisation of the conflict led to devastating 
human and economic tolls for the Kachin. Without taking combat deaths into account, over 33,000 
civilians were killed between 1962 and 1986, while the State’s economy was crippled by the 
decades of civil war (Smith, 2016). The conflict would continue with sporadic bursts of intensive 
fighting until the mid-1990s, when the SLORC government re-aligned its policy regarding  ethnic 
insurgency as the NLD emerged as a major threat to continued military rule. The sustained human 
and economic costs had been significant for the KIO leadership and, by the 1990s, had become 
difficult to sustain. Coupled with the new-found eagerness of the Tatmadaw to seek out ceasefire 
deals, in 1994, the government and the KIO signed a ceasefire agreement, bringing respite to both 
the civilians of Kachin and the KIA’s military cadre after 32 years of continuous conflict (Nilsen, 
2013). By signing the ceasefire, the KIO gave up control over its primary means of resource 
extraction, the Hpakant Jade mine, in return it was able to administer the territory in Kachin that it 
exerted control over (Woods, 2011). This relatively sudden change in circumstances for the KIO 
caused a dramatic shift in its organisational practices, as it became primarily concerned with 
sustaining its military capabilities and services through any means necessary. With the loss of its 
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prized jade mine, the KIO turned to natural resource exploitation for its survival, in particular 
logging. Exploited resources were then largely traded with Chinese entrepreneurs and moved across 
the border, leading to the formation of strong business ties between KIO officials and their 
businessmen neighbours (Woods, 2011).  
 As the the KIO struggled to extract resources from the territory under its administration, the 
military government broadened and intensified its own strategy for establishing control over the 
Kachin region, a process that Kevin Woods has described as “Ceasefire Capitalism” (2011). The 
ceasefire agreements allowed the military government to grant concessions for economic activity in 
land that it had previously had limited dominion over, allowing the Tatmadaw to turn the market 
into a weapon to combat insurgency. In the words of Kevin Woods the new dynamics of ceasefire 
politics allowed the regime to cultivate, “ceasefire capitalism as a postwar state territorializing 
strategy by approaching global finance and commodity markets, (trans-) national business people, 
and ethnic political elites” (Woods, 2011, p. 766-7). While a number ethnic elites capitalised 
through lucrative resource concessions, the majority of ordinary Kachin were forced out of resource 
extraction and farming in areas that the government allocated to business elites (Woods, 2011). 
However, on the whole, the lack of sustained violence led to significantly better circumstances for 
the majority of people living in Kachin State (Nilsen, 2013).The military-state managed to slowly 
strangle the KIO’s ability to obtain taxes and resource rents and, by the mid-2000s, the KIO/A was 
fielding significantly less troops and service projects were greatly diminished (Woods, 2011). While 
using ceasefire capitalism as a territorial securitising strategy, the Tatmadaw simultaneously 
massively increased its presence in most ethnic areas, particularly in Kachin State, with the army 
adding 15 battalions between 1994 and 2006 (Fink, 2008). The ceasefire years saw the government 
expand its sphere of influence in Kachin State, both through concessions and the continued build-up 
of military might.  
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 The KIO had been keen throughout the ceasefire years to enter into political negotiations 
with the junta, however, the military regime was not prepared to engage in political dealmaking 
before the National Convention (NC) had implemented Myanmar’s new constitution. The 
government invited the KIO to take part in the NC, which it agreed to, providing a proposal 
consisting of 19 amendments for the prospective constitution. However, the NC chairman ignored 
the KIO demands, leading to the group having no influence over the final drafting of the 
constitution. While the constitution was approved through the dubious 2008 referendum, the KIO 
declared that it did not represent their political wishes (Nilsen, 2013). Although KIO dissatisfaction 
with the constitution covered a number of political, social and economic domains, the inclusion of 
the mandated transformation of all ceasefire armed groups into a Border Guard Force (BGF) 
controlled by the Tatmadaw was particularly anathema to the KIO. Following the introduction of 
the constitution, the KIO leadership attempted to organise a political party, however, the request 
was blocked as under the 2008 constitution political groups cannot be affiliated with groups warring 
against the state (ICG, 2013). With political options limited for the KIO, the group refused to adhere 
to the government’s April 2010 deadline for the formation of the BGF, a move that prompted the 
government - led by newly elected president Thein Sein - to spin a narrative that positioned the KIO 
as insurgents (Lahpai, 2014). 
 Hostilities reignited in Kachin state in June of 2011, with the military breaking the ceasefire 
and attacking a Kachin outpost located near two Chinese operated hydropower plants, Taping 
Number One and Taping Number Two (Lahpai, 2014). Months of sustained fighting followed the 
renewed engagement, despite repeated calls by Thein Sein for the Tatmadaw to relent with 
offensive actions against the KIA, revealing the President’s impotence in the face of the military 
(Aung, 2016; Farrelly, 2014). The conflict continued to escalate through 2012 and last well into 
2013, with the military increasing its use of intensive artillery shelling of roads that linked 
Myitkyina to KIO/A territory (Nilsen, 2013). However, by May of 2013 international pressure - 
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predominantly emanating from Beijing - pushed the government into declaring unilateral ceasefire 
(Kipgen, 2015). Although a permanent ceasefire could not be implemented, the hope of continued 
dialogue between the KIA and the state lasted through the end of 2013 (Sadan, 2015). However, in 
April of 2014 the Tatmadaw broke the temporary ceasefire, attacking KIA positions along timber 
smuggling routes. By the end of 2014, the humanitarian cost of the conflict had spiralled out of 
control -gaining media attention globally -, with over 100,000 internally displaced peoples (IDPs) 
strewn across Kachin and northern Shan States (Kramer, 2015). In order to apply further pressure to 
the KIO/A, the government refused to allow humanitarian aid to reach IDPs in rebel-controlled 
areas due to “security reasons”, a tactic that Seng Maw Lahpai attributes to a ‘revitalized’ version of 
the Tatmadaw’s infamous ‘four cuts’ strategy (Lahpai, 2014).  
 Despite the worsening humanitarian crisis in Kachin State and the dwindling resources of 
the KIA, the stalemate between the military and the KIA has persisted, with little promise of an end 
to the enduring violence in Kachin State. Periodic violence has continued throughout Kachin and 
Northern Shan states, as the army has continued offensive operations against KIA combatants, 
keeping the majority of the 100,000 IDPs from returning to their villages. Clashes between the army 
and the KIA continued until start of 2018, yet the beginning of the year marked an increase in 
intensity in army operations against the KIA not seen since 2014. In fact, according to reports in the 
media the KIA have claimed 2018 to have seen the most intense fighting since the 1960s (Lewis & 
Moon, 2018). The continuing escalation of fighting in has led to a further 6,000 people to flee 
combat-zones, deepening the Kachin IDP crisis (UNHCR, 2018). Accusations of military abuses 
and atrocities have piled up during the long years of war in Kachin state, and are seen as being a 
standard strategy used by the military to subdue ethnic populations. Forced labour, rape and 
summary executions of civilians have been used as deliberate weapons of repression, a strategy that 
Lahpai describes using the term ‘state terrorism’ (Lahpai, 2014). In such circumstances, in which a 
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chronic lack of trust abides between the KIA and the government, the peace process has been 
largely ineffective and conflict remains the norm.  
  
Myanmar’s Cycles of Conflict: A sixth Cycle  
 In his 2007 work, A State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Martin Smith  
charts the anatomy of ethnic conflict since Myanmar’s independence. By contextualising civil war 
in the country through historical analysis, Smith is able to describe the cyclical nature of 
Myanmar’s ethnic conflict. The author pinpoints five ‘cycles of conflict’ that have, by the changing 
nature of both war and the individual armed groups themselves, perpetuated conflict throughout the 
country. The first of these cycles that spanned the parliamentary era of Burmese politics 
(1948-1958), saw ethnic armed groups (EAGs) establish a culture of rebellion. As EAGs did not 
have support from abroad, like the KMT and CPB forces, they were forced to prioritise “self 
sufficiency and self-defense” as daily objectives, embedding “insurgency as a way of life” (p.28). 
The second cycle covered Ne Win’s coup d’etat and escalation of conflicts with ethnic groups 
(1958-1967), with the general viewing ethnic issues as military problems rather than political 
affairs. This period culminated in the implementation of the Tatmadaw’s “draconian ‘Four Cuts’ 
campaign, designed to cut all links in food, funds, intelligence, and recruits between insurgent 
groups and the civilian population”, as well as the establishment of free fire zones that dramatically 
increased the intensity and viciousness of ethnic conflicts (p.33).  
 The third cycle (1968-1975) saw the intensification of all conflict, however, two particular 
fronts opened up, namely between the Tatmadaw and the CPB and EAGs supported by Thailand 
that formed a “buffer state”. The Fourth cycle (1976-1988) saw the pinnacle of EAG power in 
Myanmar, coupled with the failure of the “Burmese Way to Socialism” and Myanmar’s economic 
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collapse. Fuelled by the lucrative cross-border trade in drugs and other black market goods, 
insurgent groups managed to claim control over sizeable territorial enclaves and field large armies. 
During this period the KIO had to share claims of legitimate representation with the CPB, with the 
China-backed communists building roads and providing services within Kachin borderlands. The 
final cycle (1988-2006) described by Smith lasted through the SLORC/SPDC and was characterised 
by the government’s push to sign ceasefire agreements with EAGs in order to focus on the threats 
posed to the regime by the NLD. The end of this cycle saw the junta push for the establishment of 
its constitution to transition Myanmar into a ‘disciplined democracy’ (p. 46).  
 Although the majority of EAGs have ceased to base their political claims in secession from 
the Union, but rather have moved towards demands of political autonomy within the Union, 
Myanmar’s civil war is ongoing. Smith argues that this is due to the perpetual continuation of the 
underlying characteristics that have come to define conflict in Myanmar - military control of 
politics, ongoing offensive operations against a number of EAGs, widespread atrocities against 
civilians and the suppression of ethnic political rights under the 2008 constitution (Smith, 2007). 
Indeed, this framework for conflict in Myanmar extends into the present and has created - at the 
very minimum in the case of the Kachin - a sixth cycle of conflict that has extended from the 2008 
passing of the constitution until the present.  
Continuing Military Power 
 Myanmar’s transition to civilian government was a change that was heralded around the 
world as a turning point in the country’s political trajectory. The roadmap towards so-called 
disciplined democracy put into motion by Khin Nyunt in 2003 was borne out and the country held 
its first elections in 2010, electing the USDP into government, in turn the Presidential Electoral 
College appointed former general Thein Sein as president (Croissant & Kamerling, 2013). Although 
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the 2010 elections were widely denounced as being far from free, subsequent elections that the 
NLD won were not blighted by so much electoral misconduct. Yet, even with Aung San Suu Kyi 
and the NLD in power, the military still have a stranglehold over Myanmar politics.  
 The Tatmadaw continue to have indirect control over all aspects of power in Myanmar’s 
political sphere, as it is delineated in the 2008 constitution. The constitution stipulates that the 
Military has “full institutional autonomy and can reassume political control at any point” (Croissant 
& Kamerling, 2013, p.120). Article 74 of the constitution also guarantees the military 25 percent of 
the seats at both upper and lower houses of central and regional governments, allowing the army an 
effective veto over all constitutional amendments, as Article 436 stipulates all amendments require a  
majority of more than 75% (Croissant & Kamerling, 2013). Even though the constitution guarantees 
the separation of powers, the military has control over the appointing of the Union President, as it is 
the Presidential Electoral College that formally appoints the incumbent President. The Presidential 
Electoral College is squarely in the hands of the head of the armed forces, as they are responsible 
for the appointing of the colleges regional representatives. Additionally, impeachment proceedings 
can be started with just 25 percent of the parliament, the same percentage as the military’s mandated 
allotment (Croissant & Kamerling, 2013). The military has also guaranteed its right to call a state of 
emergency at any point, which would allow the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) to 
assume control over all branches of government.  As the NDSC consists of former junta leaders, the 
declaration of a state of emergency would essentially constitute a coup d’etat (Nyein, 2009).  
 The 2008 constitution additionally stipulates that three of Myanmar’s ministries are the sole 
responsibility of the armed forces, namely Home Affairs, Defence and Border Affairs (Nyein, 
2009). In order to appoint heads of these ministries, the Union President must select a serving 
member of the armed forces from a list provided by the head of the armed forces (Egreteau, 2014). 
The effective military control of these three ministries has left a substantial portion of Myanmar’s 
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governmental responsibilities in the hands of the Tatmadaw, with control over all security matters, 
internal and external residing with the head of the armed forces.  
 Although since Myanmar’s transition to semi-democracy the military has been cautious to 
engage in obstructionist political activity, the military members of parliament have consistently 
objected to bills that have aimed to curtail the military’s economic interests or the sovereignty of the 
military (Egreteau, 2015). Despite the military’s disinclination to block the development of 
parliamentary politics, it is still by a long way the strongest and most cohesive institution in 
Myanmar. This institutional cohesion has historically concentrated power amongst the military’s top 
generals, an institutional structure that remains contemporarily true (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). 
Thus, democratic reforms remain limited by continued military power and the ability of a 
democratic government led by the NLD to exert control over the Tatmadaw remains minimal 
(Jones, 2014a; Croissant & Lorenz, 2018).  
 The government’s lack of ability to control the military is an issue that resonates with 
Kachin leaders, being seen as an impediment to peace in the region. Although appraisals of the 
NLD government’s intentions in controlling the military vary, Kachin elites doubt the Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s ability to reign in the generals. In an interview conducted in Myitkyina, Reverend Dr. 
Samson Hkalam - Chairman of the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) - stated, “we are very 
discouraged about the Aung San Suu Kyi government because they cannot control the 
military” (2018). The Reverend also intimated that Suu Kyi had capitulated to the military, saying, 
“She [Aung San Suu Kyi] is afraid that if there is no military behind her, she will lose. They [the 
NLD] used to stand for justice and human rights, but when they became the government they acted 
the same as the military” (Hkalam, 2018). Although less suspicious of the NLD’s desire to control 
the military, Kachin political figures also doubt the ability of the NLD government to control the 
Tatmadaw. Kachin State Democracy Party Chairman Dr. Manam Tu Ja, likened the NLD and 
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Tatmadaw to two parallel governments, saying, “It is a conflict of colour, green versus red. They are 
going parallel, like two governments” (2018).  
Ongoing Military offensives 
 As noted earlier military action is ongoing in Myanmar, with conflict still raging in Kachin 
State, Rakhine State and Shan State (Callahan, 2018). The military has pursued a selective approach 
in regards to military engagement with EAGs, attacking KIA positions in 2011 ostensibly for not 
sign ing the BGF agreement, even though other EAGs reaffirmed ceasefires while refusing too sign 
the agreement (Moe, 2011). The ceasefires between the Tatmadaw and Wa and Mongla armed 
groups have been held since 2011, even though these groups refused to sign the National Ceasefire 
Agreement along with the Northern Alliance, of which the KIA is a member (Callahan, 2018). This 
selective military aggression can be seen to be part of the military’s attempt to employ a strategy of 
divide and rule, a strategy the military has historically used in dealing with ethnic issues (South, 
2008).Indeed, the ‘divide and rule’ strategy employed by the Tatmadaw in peace negotiations has 
remained fairly rigid since the SPDC/SLORC era (South, 2004), with the military seeking to deal 
individually with EAGs rather than with alliances such as the Northern alliance.  
 The armies strategy in fighting ethnic groups has drawn further comparison to the junta era, 
with the current war in Kachin eschewing in a revitalisation of the military’s ‘four cuts’ policy 
adapted for Myanmar’s era of democratisation (Lahpai, 2014). The four underlying principles of 
this revitalised strategy employ outward calls for unilateral ceasefire by the government; blocking 
humanitarian relief for the 100,000 Kachin IDPs dislocated from their communities due to violence; 
a sustained campaign of ‘Nazi-like’ propaganda in state-media and affiliated news streams; and 
offensive military action and human rights abuses (Lahpai, 2014, p. 293-294). This government 
campaign was on full show during an ASEAN meeting in Bali in 2011, at which President Thein 
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Sein both called for a holt to offensive military operations and issued threats the KIA. The former 
leader declared that the Tatmadaw could annihilate the KIA in a matter of hours, if it so wished 
(Lahpai, 2014). 
 Kachin leaders are clear in attributing the blame for continuing violence between the KIA 
and the Tatmadaw, criticising the military’s divisive strategies and continuing offensives. Dr. Tu Ja 
criticised the military’s strategy, noting, “The military is using the talk talk, fight fight strategy. On 
the one hand they hold peace talks, on the other hand they launch offensives against ethnic 
groups” (2018). He additionally mentioned that the Tatmadaw’s strategy constituted a fundamental 
roadblock to peace and that any cessation in fighting would require the army to stop its offensive 
manoeuvres. Similarly, Reverend Dr. Samson Hkalam noted that the large increases in army 
battalions stationed in the state only fuelled the conflict. The KBC chairman stated, “For example, 
in the Kachin area if you want to see peace, then all military troops must withdraw. During the 
seven years since  [the breakdown in the ceasefire] they have many new military posts in the 
Kachin area. If all new military posts withdraw, then we will see peace” (2018). In similar fashion, 
Miss Ja Seng Hkawn said, “How can we pressure the Myanmar military leaders they are the 
problem … the Panglong conference is ongoing but still they send troops” (2018).  
Widespread Military Atrocities 
 Atrocities committed by the Tatmadaw in ethnic areas have been many, frequent and 
adopted by the military as a means of systematically suppressing ethnic populations. The military’s 
actions in Arakan State against the Rohingya has dominated headlines around the world, bringing 
renewed focus to the plight of ethnic peoples in Myanmar. Tatmadaw war crimes against the 
Rohingya have been labelled ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the UN, with some denouncing them as 
‘genocide’ (Barany, 2018). The military’s history of abusing human rights of local ethnic 
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populations, a practice that has fuelled recruitment for EAGs and further embittered local 
populations. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report from the 1970s lambasted Ne Win’s 
regime’s “ruthless and poorly focused” operations against the KIA, exemplified by the razing of 
entire villages, forced mass migration, mass rape, and summary executions (Lahpai, 2014). While 
rape was used as a weapon of war against ethnic women, forced labour was used as a weapon 
against ethnic male populations who were coerced into portering for military battalions (Smith, 
2007). These egregious violations of human rights have become common place in the Tatmadaw’s 
campaigns in Kachin State, and, according to Lahpai, constitute ‘state terrorism’ (2014, p.287). This 
issue is particularly salient in fuelling KIA popularity and recruitment in the present day and 
remains central in motivating insurgency.  
 Statistics detailing the prevalence of rights abuses are notoriously difficult to ascertain, 
relying almost completely on the United Nations and NGOs, with institutional human rights 
documentation virtually non-existent. Additionally, reporting of human rights violations by civilians 
is often hampered by the fear of repercussions from the military, with family members and victims 
being detained for speaking out (Pwint, 2018). A United Nations report noted that rights violations 
have ‘constituted the norm’ since the breakdown of the ceasefire in 2011 (UNHRC, 2018). 
However, between 2011 and 2014 at least 64 women and girls were raped by army soldiers and over 
40 men were detained and forced to porter for local battalions (Lahpai, 2014). These atrocities are 
fuelled by an institutional culture of ethnic chauvinism developed in the military and lack of 
substantive repercussions for perpetrators. 
 Although incidents of human rights abuse are endemic to the fighting in Kachin State, the 
most brutal have become deeply entrenched in the narratives of ethnic suppression in recent years. 
In 2011, two young women were kidnapped by a military patrol operating to the south of Myitkyina 
and forced accompany the soldiers for a number of weeks, being raped by officers on a nightly basis 
(Lahpai, 2014). The brutality of the soldiers’ actions were to repeat themselves in 2015, when two 
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volunteer KBC teachers Maran Lu Ra (20) and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin (20) were kidnapped 
from Khaungkha village in Northern Shan State, brutally raped and subsequently murdered by a 
local battalion (Nyein & Weng, 2015). 
 This sentiment was reiterated by Dr. Reverend Hkalam during our interview, with two 
notable aspects of Tatmadaw atrocities standing out. The first of these were the killings of the the 
two KBC teachers win Northern Shan State, while the second centred on the continual use of 
artillery and areal bombardments by the military during the lead-up to Christmas:  
Even in December, Christmas time, they attack the Kachin. We have many IDPs from 
that time. Over the 23rd, 24th and 25th they fire artillery and helicopter gunships. So 
we have lost hope. We want them to respect this day, but they target us on this day  
for six years already…Its symbolic, they make us fear (Hkalam, 2018). 
The use of symbolic attacks during Christmas is seen as an articulation of the military’s Burman and 
Buddhist chauvinism. Indeed, these attacks are used as a form of mental attrition, used to slowly 
strangle the KIA’s resistance. Yet, at the same time these attacks fuel Kachin outrage against the 
government and the Tatmadaw.  
Ethnic Rights and the 2008 Constitution  
 The 2008 constitution, designed by the military to ensure the army leadership’s continuing 
centrality in the political process in Myanmar as well as its institutional autonomy was approved by 
an implausible by an implausible 93.8%, with a turnout of 98% during a referendum in the 
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis (Jones, 2014b). The constitution ensured the military would stay a 
unitary force and demanded that the country’s ethnic armed groups turn into so-called BGFs and 
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outlined Myanmar’s limited decentralisation, through which 14 partially elected assemblies would 
be established (Holliday et al., 2015). However, the lack of substantive progress in regards to 
devolution and the refusal of EAGs to be integrated into an army that has long been accused of 
Burman chauvinism have driven distrust and conflict in Kachin state.  
 While it could be argued that the establishment of regional assemblies in Myanmar is a step 
in the right direction, the decentralisation process has been severely hampered by the constitution 
and the power of regional assemblies has similarly been limited at best. The ability of regional 
assemblies to exert any functional control over policy has been limited by their structure and lack of 
engagement with genuine policy issues. In Kachin State, the structure of the regional assembly is 
such that any ethnic group with more than 50,000 inhabitants must be represented at ministerial 
level, this has led to a level of factionalism in the state’s cabinet. According to Holliday et al., the 
result is, “something akin to a divide-and-rule strategy” (Holliday et al., 2015). Additionally, state’s 
are frequently unable to engaging with issues that remain important the their constituents, with the 
Kachin State assembly playing “no substantial role” in addressing the ongoing violence (Holliday 
bet al., 2015). Indeed, the lack of conference in state level governance is no surprise when their lack 
of funding and policy remit is taken into account.   
  The NLD won a landslide victory in the 2015 elections in Kachin State, riding promises of 
amending the constitution to improve the provision of ethnic political rights. However, to date the 
government has refused to engage in discussions relating to the implementation of State 
constitutions, unless all armed groups “reject any possibility of secession” (Callahan, 2018, p.255). 
In an interview with Ms Ja Seng Hkawn she noted how angry the Kachin were at the NLD’s failure 
to live up to their promises, with many Kachin ‘scalding’ the democracy party through Facebook 
(2018). Ja Seng Hkawn was adamant in pointing out that “right now our main problem is the 2008 
constitution”, however, she noted, “within Myanmar we have less hope to change the 2008 
constitution”.  
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 While EAGs, including the KIA, have long given up their demands to secede from the 
Union (Smith, 2007), a longstanding demand has been the implementation of state-level 
constitutions that guarantee the rights of ethnic peoples under a truly federal system of government 
(Callahan, 2018). Agreeing to this compromise should have been achievable, however, state 
constitutions remain a pipe dream, showing the deep lack of trust between EAGs and the 
government. Indeed, as Dr Tu Ja phrased it, “Our policy is for federalism, including the KIO. The 
KIO want a federal union … without self-determination and a state constitution, we cannot have 
federalism” (2018). Though, he continued to explain that the first step in alleviating the conflict had 
to involve the government devolving power, saying, “More ethnic rights, more peace. Peace means 
to achieve political rights. Without achieving political rights, we cannot achieve peace. Political 
rights means to fulfil the desire of ethnic peoples” (2018).  
 The devolution of power to regional governments additionally does not cover the key 
aspects of power sharing that EAGs have demanded. While ethnic area assemblies now have a 
degree of responsibility for a number of policy areas, the constitution prohibits the devolution of 
power over most educational affairs, resource extraction and allocation, and, most importantly, 
security (Joliffe, 2015). The KIA rejected the government’s demands to re-mobilise as a BGF force, 
within which Tatmadaw officers would be embedded. The majority of EAGs support a hard 
federalism that would create different armed forces representative of their state, with the central 
government controlling foreign affairs (Taylor, 2017). A federal army may be a rather bold 
ambition, however, the fact that the Tatmadaw’s officer corps are predominantly of Burman 
ethnicity is a major obstacle to peace initiatives. In order to begin to address this issue, at the very 
least, “Myanmar’s armed forces not only should be ethnically representative but be seen and 
understood to be so” (Taylor, 2017, p.8). The issue of control over security matters has become a 
focal point in the peace process, with the many ethnic armed groups viewing a federal armed forces 
as the only political solution to the dilemma of having multiple armed groups in many states. 
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Conclusion 
  Conflict continues to rage in Kachin State, and the possibility of a peace deal looking as 
distant as ever. Fighting in the rural areas has displaced more than a 100,000 Kachin, who remain 
stuck in IDP camps, dislocated from their homes and livelihoods. The continuing Kachin conflict 
has shown how civil war in Myanmar has moved through a number of cycles, with the 
contemporary cycle — maintaining the underlying dynamics of conflict in Myanmar — the 
military’s continued hold on power, their ongoing offensives against the Kachin, rampant human 
rights abuses, and the lack of improvement in ethnic political rights written into the 2008 
constitution. These four key components have driven the violence since the 2011 breakdown of the 
ceasefire that had held for the previous 17 years. The suppression of ethnic language rights in both 
education and the citizens’ interaction has undoubtedly fostered distrust and animosity amongst the 
Kachin. However, in its current stage, the military’s continuing assault on KIA positions and the 
atrocities committed by soldiers in Kachin State are the key causes fuelling conflict in the region. 
Without an end to the military’s engagement in Kachin State, there will be no lasting peace.  
 Other ‘grievance’ factors that have had an impact on the conflict, such as the 
overexploitation of natural resources and the inequality of opportunity in education, are also of deep 
importance to the Kachin. Yet these issues remain secondary to the Kachin elite. Politicians and 
ethnic leaders are more concerned with gaining a broader set of political rights, which would only 
be possible once amendments are made to the 2008 constitution. Federalism has become 
synonymous with ethnic political rights for the Kachin elite, with the Kachin political parties and 
the influential Kachin Baptist Convention pushing for this singular aim. Indeed, the call for 
federalism is not only one that has been championed by Kachin politicians, but one that is supported 
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by the KIO/A. However, the current process of devolution of power to regional assemblies remains 
limited in scope and falls far short of Kachin desires for semi-autonomy.  
 In their 2018 article, Dynamics of Language and Education Policy in Myanmar, Lall and 
South write, “despite clear linkages between the ethnic conflict and education reform, the two 
processes are not formally linked in the peace process” (p.486). In the case of the Kachin, language 
issues are taking a secondary position, behind the cessation of violence and broad constitutional 
reform. This was made pointedly clear by MP Ja Seng Hkawn, who stated, “Mother-tongue 
[education] is not the problem, only federal[isation] is the problem” (2018).  
 To date, the military has unilaterally broken two ceasefires, in 2011 and again in 2013. And 
a new ceasefire looks unlikely in the wake of continued bombardment of KIA positions throughout 
2018. Although it may seem an obvious step, in order for the peace process to move forward the 
military must disengage from its offensive operations. Additionally, without legitimate 
accountability for human rights violations that are perpetrated in ethnic areas, the grievances of 
ethnic peoples will not be addressed and EAGs will continue to use atrocities to bolster recruitment. 
However, continuing military political control has also hampered the ability of the NLD to reign in 
the army’s operations and excesses in Kachin State, leaving little hope amongst Kachin that an end 
to war is in sight.  
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